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This paper examines the effect of attending the flagship state university on the earnings 
of 28 - 33 year-olds by combining confidential admissions records from a large state 
university  with  earnings  data  collected  through  the  state’s  Unemployment  Insurance 
program.  To distinguish the effect of attending the flagship state university from the 
effects of confounding factors correlated with the university’s admission decision and/or 
the applicant’s enrollment decision, I exploit a large discontinuity in the probability of 
enrollment at the admission cutoff.  The results indicate that attending the most selective 
state university causes earnings to be approximately 20% higher for white men.   
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1.  Introduction 
While there is has been considerable study of the effect of educational attainment 
on earnings, less is known regarding the economic returns to college quality.  This paper 
examines the economic returns to college quality in the context of attending the most 
selective public state university.  It does so using an intuitive regression discontinuity 
design that compares the earnings of 28-33 year-olds who were barely admitted to the 
flagship to those of individuals who were barely rejected.    
  In order to convincingly estimate the economic returns to college quality, one 
must overcome the selection bias arising from the fact that attendance at more selective 
universities is likely correlated with unobserved characteristics that themselves will affect 
future earnings.  Such biases could arise for two reasons.  First, bias could arise if certain 
student abilities or characteristics are observed by college admissions committees but not 
by the econometrician.  Second, bias could arise if, conditional on all observable student 
and family characteristics and admission to the more selective university, the decision to 
attend that university is correlated with unobserved student or family characteristics that 
would themselves affect subsequent earnings. 
Researchers have taken several approaches to answering this question, and have 
done so primarily in the context of private colleges or universities generally rather than 
state flagship universities.  Black and Smith (2004) describe problems that can arise for 
much of this literature that relies on the assumption of “selection on observables.”  
Several other approaches have also been applied, however.  Dale and Krueger (2002) 
compare the earnings of students attending more selective colleges to those of students 
who were accepted at similarly selective colleges but who chose to attend less selective 
institutions.  They find that attending more selective colleges has a positive effect on  
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earnings only for students from low-income families.  Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg 
(1999) estimate the payoff by explicitly modeling high school students’ choice of college 
type and find significant returns to attending an elite private institution for all students.  
Behrman, Rozenzweig, and Taubman (1996) identify the effect by comparing female 
twin pairs and find evidence of a positive payoff from attending Ph.D.-granting private 
universities with well-paid senior faculty; Lindahl and Regner (2005) use Swedish sibling 
data and show that cross-sectional estimates of the selective college wage premium are 
twice the within-family estimates.     
This paper utilizes a different identification strategy in that it identifies the effect of 
school selectivity on earnings by comparing the earnings of those just below the cutoff 
for admission to the flagship state university to those of applicants who were barely 
above the cutoff for admission.  To do so, I combined confidential administrative records 
from a large flagship state university with earnings records collected by the state through 
the Unemployment Insurance program.  To put the selectivity of the flagship in context, 
the average SAT scores of the entering classes at the flagship over the period of time 
studied were between 1,000 and 1,100, which were approximately 65-90 points higher 
than the 5 next-most-selective public state universities.   
  The unique data set used allows this paper to make two primary contributions to 
the existing literature.  First, by utilizing the application data from a large flagship state 
university, this paper addresses the question of how college selectivity affects earnings in 
the context in which the public policy decision is made.  Indeed, although determining 
the effect of attending an elite private college over a less selective one is interesting for 
several reasons, the public policy question is largely confined to the extent to which  
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admission at flagship state universities affects the subsequent earnings of various 
subgroups.   
  Second, because this paper uses actual admissions data from the university, it can 
apply an intuitive discontinuity-based research design to detect whether or not there are 
economic returns to college quality.  I do so by applying a regression discontinuity design 
similar to many other recent papers (e.g., Jacob and Lefgren, 2004), though similar 
results are obtained when an approach similar to Angrist and Lavy (1999) is used.
1  To do 
so, I transform the two-dimensional admission rule into a one-dimensional score.  I report 
both intent-to-treat effects (i.e., the effect of admission at the flagship) and enrollment 
effect estimates, both of which capture local average treatment effects (Angrist, Imbens, 
and Rubin, 1996).    
I find strong evidence of large positive discontinuities at the admission cutoff in the 
earnings of white men 10-15 years after high school graduation.  The estimates imply that 
enrolling at the flagship state university yields an economic return of approximately 20% 
higher earnings.  This earnings premium is relative to those applicants who were barely 
rejected by the flagship in a state in which over 85% of college-going residents attend 
college in-state and in which there are 7 less selective public state universities from 
which to choose.  In addition, although here I focus primarily on the results for men due 
to potential complications that arise in the labor market for women during these ages, I 
also find that while there is little evidence of an effect for white women overall, there is 
some suggestive evidence of a positive effect for white women with strong attachment to 
                                                 
1 See Appendix B.  The primary benefit of the more traditional instrumental variable approach is that to 
implement it I do not need to collapse the two-dimensional admission rule into one dimension.  Instead, 
whether an individual is above the admission cutoff serves as an instrument for actual admission or 
enrollment.    
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the labor force.
2  Finally, I find no evidence that admission to the flagship causes either 
men or women to be more or less likely to be observed in the in-state labor force 10 – 15 
years later.   
 
2.  Data and Identification Strategy 
2.1  Data Sources 
  The data used in this study are from two sources.  The administrative data on 
admissions were acquired from a large flagship state university.  As part of the agreement 
in acquiring the data, I agreed not to disclose the name of the institution involved.  The 
university was able to retrieve the following information for every white student that 
applied for admission to the university from 1986 – 1989: Social Security Number, sex, 
term for which the student was applying for admission, ACT score
3, SAT score, and 
whether or not the student subsequently enrolled.  Finally, I also observe each student’s 
high school GPA, a discrete (to the nearest tenth of a point) number recalculated by the 
university after excluding certain courses and adjusting for different scales used by high 
schools.    
  These data were then sent directly from the university admissions office to a state 
office to which employers submit Unemployment Insurance tax reports.  Using the 
provided Social Security Numbers, quarterly earnings records from 1998 through the 
                                                 
2 See Appendix C.  The major issue in interpreting results for women is that while I find no evidence of a 
difference in the labor force participation rates of women at the admission cutoff, I do not observe the 
number of hours worked.  Consequently, if women who enroll at the flagship are (say) more likely to work 
part-time during the examined ages of 28 – 33, I may not observe a premium in earnings even if wages 
were higher.   
3 ACT scores were converted to SAT score equivalents using a conversion table published by the 
university.    
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second quarter of 2005 were matched to the university records.  All nominal wages were 
adjusted using the CPI so as to be measured in 2005 dollars.   
Of the total number of white male applicants, approximately 2.5% were excluded 
from this analysis because they were missing either an SAT score or GPA.  An additional 
19% of the applicant pool were dropped because they missed the admission cutoff by 
more than 300 SAT points or exceeded it by more than 350 SAT points or had grade 
point averages higher than 4.0 or lower than 2.0.
4  Finally, 86 applicants were excluded 
because their applications were cancelled prior to the admission decision.  The final 
sample includes data on 12,189 applicants, of whom 8,424 were observed with at least 
one year of earnings between ages 28 and 33.   
  One advantage of these earnings data is that they allow the examination of 
earnings well after nearly all applicants have completed their educations.  The primary 
results in the paper are based on earnings observed 10 to 15 years after high school 
graduation—or when the applicants were between the ages of 28 and 33 years old.  These 
earnings are much more likely to be predictive of lifetime earnings than are earnings 
observed for people in their early and mid-twenties who are still finishing their 
educations and sorting themselves in the job market.   Another advantage of these 
administrative data is that they likely contain less measurement error relative to survey 
data.  Finally, Unemployment Insurance coverage is mandatory in the state, with 
relatively few exemptions allowed.
5 
                                                 
4 The results are similar when the entire sample of applicants observed with SAT scores and high school 
GPAs is used.   
5 For example, employers must report its employment wages if its quarterly payroll exceeds $1500, or if it 
meets any number of other criteria.  Employment not covered that could potentially be relevant for the 
individuals here includes employees of a church or religious association, unsalaried insurance agents, real 
estate agents, and barbers who are paid solely on commission, and unsalaried speech, occupational, and 
physical therapists who contract with health agencies.     
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One drawback of using this data set is that an individual’s earnings will not be 
observed if he has moved out of state.  While this would be of particular concern if 
working in-state were endogenous to admission at the flagship state university, in results 
available upon request I find no evidence that this is the case.
6   
Perhaps the largest drawback of the data used in this paper is that there is no 
information on where rejected applicants ultimately attended college, though in Section 6 
I describe survey data and the characteristics and availability of alternative in-state public 
universities that provide some guidance as to the nature of the counterfactual.   
Finally, while these data allow me to display strong evidence that the effect of 
attending the flagship state university on earnings is large, it is difficult to determine the 
precise mechanism through which earnings are increased.  This issue is explored further 
in Section 6.     
2.2  Earnings Measures 
Earnings were calculated in the following way.  For each applicant, I calculated the 







th years following high school graduation, or when the 
individuals were approximately 28 to 33 years old.
7,8  Consequently, only the earnings of 
                                                 
6 Specifically, I examine whether or not there is a discontinuity in the likelihood of being observed with 
annual earnings in each of the 7
th through 15
th years after high school graduation.  Second, I examine 
whether or not there is a discontinuity in the likelihood than individuals are observed with at least one year 
of earnings from age 28 to 33.  I find nothing in either case.  A related objection is that perhaps the most 
capable of the rejected applicants select to attend college out of state, while it is the least capable of the 
barely-accepted applicants that choose to attend college or work out of state.  While I cannot completely 
rule out this type of selective, offsetting, attrition, it is comforting to note that relatively few students from 
the state in question attend out-of-state universities.  According to the 1998 Residence and Migration 
Survey, over 85% of college students originally from this state were enrolled in a college in their home 
state.   
7 The advantage of examining earnings in this time period was shown by Mincer (1974), who showed that 
the return to schooling can be underestimated if earnings prior to the “year of overtaking” are used.  
Assuming that the cost of investment is constant over time, that year is equal to (1+1/r) years after the 
completion of formal education, where r is the interest rate.  Thus, assuming r=0.09 and an applicant  
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those who had positive reported earnings for the 4 consecutive quarters were included in 
the calculations, although qualitatively and quantitatively similar estimates resulted when 
an average earnings figure was calculated on the basis of non-missing quarterly earnings 
figures.
 9   
Since no patterns in the estimates of the effect of enrolling at the flagship were 
evident over time when the earnings measures were examined year by year, I stacked the 
annual earnings figures from the 10
th through 15
th years together, resulting in a data set 
that contained up to 6 observations of earnings for each applicant.  To ensure that each 
applicant is only included in the analysis once while at the same time reducing noise as 
much as possible, I utilize a first-within-then-between estimator.  That is, first I estimate 
the following: 
(1) ln(Earnings) = ψYear + φExperience + θcohort +  ε 
where ψYear is a vector of year dummy variables, φExperience is a vector of dummy 
variables for the number of years after high school graduation in which the earnings were 
observed, and  θcohort is a vector of dummy variables controlling for the cohort in which 
the individual applied to the flagship (e.g., Fall 1988).  The residuals from this regression 
were then averaged for each applicant, with the resulting average residual earnings 
                                                                                                                                                 
finishes schooling at age 22, the year of overtaking is 22 + 12.1 = 34.1, which is approximately the age 
examined in this paper.  This matters to the extent that attending the flagship university causes differences 
in post-schooling investment.   
8 For example, to calculate earnings after 15 years for those who applied for admission in the fall of 1986, I 
used earnings received from the 3
rd quarter of 2001 through the 2
nd quarter of 2002.  Similarly, for those 
who applied for admission in the fall of 1987, I used earnings received from the 3
rd quarter of 2002 through 
the 2
nd quarter of 2003, and so on.   
9 That measure was calculated as 4 times the average quarterly earnings over the four quarters, treating the 
lack of any reported income in a quarter as a missing value rather than as a zero.  This is due to the fact that 
for individuals who as 18 year-olds were near the admission cutoff of the flagship university, missing 
values for an entire quarter are more likely due to things like out-of-state employment or full-time 
schooling than unemployment.     
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measure being used to implement the result of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem in the 
primary earnings estimations.   
2.3  Identification Strategy and Estimation 
This paper uses the admission discontinuity to estimate the causal effect of 
enrollment at the state’s flagship university on earnings.  This design will distinguish the 
effect of enrollment at the flagship university from other confounding factors so long as 
the determinants of earnings (e.g., motivation, parental support, etc.) are continuous at the 
admission cutoff.  Under this assumption, any discontinuous jump in earnings at the 
admission cutoff is properly interpreted as the causal effect of admission to the flagship 
university on earnings.   
This condition will fail in this context if either applicants or the university can 
manipulate the side of the cutoff on which applicants fall.  For applicants, this would be a 
problem if those who would barely miss the cutoff were to retake the SAT until they 
surpassed the cutoff.  In reality, such a scenario is unlikely for the simple reason that the 
admission rule was never published or revealed by the university and, in fact, was 
changed (albeit moderately) from year to year.  Consequently, it is unlikely that the 
applicant would know, prior to applying, whether or not he was just above the cutoff or 
just below it.  While the best way of testing this would be to look for discontinuities in 
other predetermined outcomes, in the absence of such data one can examine the 
distribution of applicants near the cutoff.  As shown in Appendix A, there is no dip in the 
distribution that would suggest applicants manipulate where they are relative to the 
admission cutoff.   
It is also unlikely that the university defined the admission cutoff at the point at 
which students with above-average unobservables lie just above the line whereas students  
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with below-average unobservables lie just below the line.
10  In contrast, according to 
those familiar with the process at the time, the admission cutoffs were designed in order 
to achieve a target enrollment level.   
  One approach to estimate the discontinuity at the cutoff is to compare the earnings 
of those who barely were admitted to those who were barely rejected.  However, this 
approach ignores all earnings information for those who are also close to the admission 
cutoff, making the estimate more susceptible to noise in the data.   
An alternative approach is used here instead.  Specifically, I show the discontinuity 
in the outcome of interest graphically by controlling for a function of the one-
dimensional admission score that determines admission, described later and referred to as 
the adjusted SAT score.
11  Specifically, I use ordinary least squares regression to estimate 
the equation 
  (2) Outcome = β0 +  β1(AboveAdmissionCutoff) +  γ1(h(Adjusted SAT Score)) + 
γ2GPA +  γ3(SAT Score)+  ε 
where AboveAdmissionCutoff =1 if (Adjusted SAT Score) >0, h(Adjusted SAT 
Score) is a polynomial function of the adjusted SAT score—a one-dimensional admission 
score described in detail in the next section.  In this specification, since the discontinuity 
in the probability of enrollment is less than one, all estimates of β1 need to be reweighted 
                                                 
10 Note that this is different from the university choosing to admit a student whose qualifications leave him 
short of the admission cutoff (or choosing not to admit someone whose qualifications left him above the 
cutoff).  As discussed later, the existence of these applicants (noncompliers) does not undermine the 
identification strategy.  Rather, the estimates presented should be interpreted as the effect only for those 
whose admission or enrollment decisions were determined by the admission cutoff (i.e., the compliers). 
11 An alternative approach that does not necessitate creating the one-dimensional score is to instrument for 
enrollment using a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is above the admission cutoff.  This 
approach is similar to Angrist and Lavy (1999) and yields enrollment effects of around 15-20%.  The 
results are available upon request from the author.    
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by the discontinuity in enrollment in order to calculate the effect of enrolling at the 
flagship state university.   
Finally, in estimating the earnings equation, I regress the (averaged-by-individual) 
earnings residuals from equation (1) on the residuals from the independent variables in 
equation (2) that result from partialing out year, age/experience, and cohort effects.  In 
doing so, I apply the result of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem to recover the 
coefficients of interest in equations (2).
12   
 
3.  The Admission Rule 
3.1  The Nature of the Admission Rule 
Over the time period in question, the admission cutoff was a two-dimensional 
nonlinear sliding scale that depended on both SAT score and high school GPA.
13  
Consequently, for a given high school GPA, the student was admitted if her SAT score 
met or exceeded the cutoff SAT score.  Higher GPAs meant that lower SAT scores were 
required for admission.   
In order to more easily observe the importance of the discontinuity in the 
probability of admission and enrollment (and ultimately earnings), it is helpful to convert 
the admission rule into a one-dimensional rule.  To do so, I calculated an “adjusted SAT 
score” for each student by subtracting the SAT score required for admission, given the 
student’s high school GPA, from each student’s actual SAT score.  This effectively 
captures the number of SAT points the student scored above or below the admission 
cutoff, given that student’s high school GPA.  For example, if an SAT score of 1300 were 
                                                 
12 Due to the two-step process, standard errors were calculated via bootstrapping.       
13 At that time, students were not asked to write essays or include letters or recommendation.    
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necessary for admission given a student’s high school GPA of 2.0 and that student scored 
a 1350 on the SAT, that student was assigned a score of 50.  As a result, all students 
assigned scores of 0 or higher were predicted to be accepted to the flagship university.   
3.2  Determining the Admission Rule 
While those on the admissions committee recall the general form of the admission 
rule, the university did not keep records of the exact admission rules used.  Consequently, 
the admission rules were estimated using the admissions data.  In order to do that, the 
data were first partitioned by term of application (either summer or fall).  The data were 
then partitioned further by high school GPA, after which the following equation was 
estimated for each subgroup using ordinary least squares:  
Acceptance = β0 + β1(SAT_Cutoff) + є 
where Acceptance is a dummy variable equal to one if the student was accepted and  
SAT_Cutoff was a dummy variable equal to one if the SAT score was greater than or 
equal to a given SAT score.   
  For example, the SAT cutoff for the fall of 1986 for white applicants with a high 
school GPA of 3.5 was determined by repeatedly estimating this equation for that subset 
of applicants using all possible SAT scores (e.g., from 800 to 1600) as the cutoff.  The 
SAT score that resulted in the estimation with the highest R
2 was the cutoff that was then 
used.
14  This process was repeated for all cohorts.  For example, it was repeated for the 
fall of 1986 for white applicants with a high school GPA of 3.6, and then 3.7, etc.   
 
                                                 
14 The “winning” R
2 was typically around 0.5.    
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4.  Does the Admission Cutoff Predict the Enrollment Decisions of Applicants? 
The first empirical question to address is whether or not the probability of 
enrollment at the university is discontinuous at the admission cutoff.  The discontinuity in 
enrollment is shown graphically Figure 1, which takes the same form as others presented 
after it.  It shows the probability of enrollment at the flagship (the outcome) on the 
vertical axis and the number of SAT points above or below the cutoff given the student’s 
high school GPA on the horizontal axis.  The open circles represent local averages.  For 
example, at an adjusted SAT score of zero (i.e., for students who barely met the estimated 
admission cutoff), the open circle is the percentage of those applicants who enrolled at 
the flagship.  Also shown is a fitted line from the regression of the outcome on a 
polynomial of adjusted SAT score.    
  As shown in Figure 1, the discontinuity in enrollment is approximately 37 
percentage points, the t-statistic of which just over 10.
15  Consequently, it is clear that 
being just above the admission cutoff causes a large and statistically significant increase 
in the probability of attending the flagship state university.     
 
5.  Results  
5.1.  Earnings Discontinuities at the Admission Cutoff 
To the extent that there are economic returns to attending the flagship state 
university, one should observe a discontinuity in earnings at the admission cutoff.  This is 
shown for white men on Figure 2, which shows a regression of residual earnings on a 
cubic polynomial of adjusted SAT score.  Table 1 shows the discontinuity estimates that 
                                                 
15 The discontinuity in admission is around 66-67 percentage points, depending on the specification.    
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result from varying functional form assumptions
16 and bandwidths, the results of which 
reveal statistically significant earnings discontinuities on the order of 7.4% - 11.1%.  In 
general, the estimates are larger as higher order and more flexible polynomials are used.  
Finally, in results available upon request, I find suggestive but inconclusive evidence that 
the earnings premium is larger for students who have high school grade point averages 
above the median given their adjusted SAT score, term, and year.  This suggests that 
students who, say, tend to work harder in the classroom but test lower experience either 
high human capital accumulation or a larger signaling effect due to attending the 
flagship.
17   
It is comforting to note that the estimates are not affected in a meaningful way by 
the inclusion of control variables such as actual SAT score and high school GPA, 
consistent with the identifying assumption of the regression discontinuity design.  In 
addition, the results do not appear to be driven by earnings outliers; the discontinuity 
using median regression fit with an inflexible cubic yields a statistically significant 
discontinuity estimate of 10.0%.   
                                                 
16 Due to concern for potential specification error of the type described by Card and Lee (2006) that arises 
in estimating the cutoff assuming that the specification errors are independent but unequal, the standard 
errors were computed by bootstrapping using the adjusted SAT score as the resampling cluster.  In 
addition, I ran goodness-of-fit tests as outlined in Card and Lee (2006).  While the null hypothesis that the 
polynomial is not too restrictive is not rejected for any of the polynomials in rows 1 – 3, the test statistic 
does indicate that the flexible quadratic is “better” than the inflexible quadratic (not shown) and the cubic is 
(very slightly) “better” than the flexible quadratic.  Furthermore, while more flexible specifications for the 
restricted samples used in rows 4 and 5 are slightly preferred to those shown, allowing for higher order 
and/or more flexible polynomials there yields even larger estimates than those shown.  For example, 
allowing for a flexible linear function in specification (5) increases the estimated discontinuity from 7.4% 
to 10.8%.  Consequently, the upshot is that to the extent that there is specification error, it appears less 
likely for those specifications yielding larger estimates.   
17 Specifically, in equation 2, I add a dummy variable indicating if the applicant’s high school GPA was 
higher than the median for men with the same adjusted SAT score who applied in the same term and year.  
I also interact that dummy variable with the dummy variable indicating if the applicant was above the 
admission cutoff.  The earnings discontinuity for students with above-median GPAs ranges from 3.2 to 7.8 
percentage points higher than those for students with below-median GPAs for the five specifications shown 
in Table 1, though only 2 of the differences are statistically significant at the 10% level.      
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5.2  Intent-to-Treat and Enrollment Effects 
In order to calculate the effect of admission and enrollment on earnings, the 
earnings discontinuities reported in the previous section must be reweighted by the 
enrollment (or admission) discontinuities due to the “fuzzy” discontinuities in admission 
and enrollment.  I do this using two-stage least squares,
18 for which the first stage F-
statistics are over 300.  The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 1 and 
suggest intent-to-treat (i.e., admission) effects ranging from 11.0% to 17.0% and 
enrollment effects of at least 18.1%.   
 
6.  Interpretation  
Like other papers (e.g., Jacob and Lefgren, 2004), the approach used in this paper 
utilizes a “fuzzy” discontinuity design due to the fact that the estimated discontinuities in 
admission and enrollment rates are less than one.  While this does not invalidate the 
research design, it does change the interpretation of the estimates.  The estimates 
presented here are local average treatment effects and should be interpreted as the causal 
effect only for those applicants on the margin whose enrollment decisions were 
determined by the admission guideline.   While clearly not everyone’s enrollment 
decision was determined by this admission cutoff, as shown in Figure 1 it was clearly a 
determining factor for a significant proportion of applicants.
19   
                                                 
18 For a rigorous discussion of the relationship between discontinuity estimates and 2SLS estimates, see 
Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001).     
19 Several factors likely caused the “fuzziness” of the admission and enrollment discontinuities.  First, a 
handful of high schools had reputations for giving lower grades than average.  Second, as with any Division 
I school, exceptions to the admission policy were made on the basis of other nonacademic issues.  In 
addition, it is possible that there was some degree of error in either the decision-making process or the 
reporting process as well as potentially in the estimation of the rule in those cells in which there were 
relatively few observations.  Even more significantly, in any given term the university aimed to enroll a 
certain number of students.  Given uncertainty about yields, the university would often change the  
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The premium of 20% that accrues to men as a result of attending the flagship state 
university is larger than the size of the effect of one additional year of schooling 
estimated at around 9% (e.g., Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998).  It is thus natural to wonder 
about the mechanism through which enrollment at the flagship increased earnings.   
One question is whether barely-rejected applicants attended college elsewhere. In 
answering that question, the first thing to note is that while I do not directly observe the 
enrollment decisions of those who do not enroll at the flagship (including those who just 
fell short of admission to the flagship), there certainly were several opportunities for 
those applicants to attend college elsewhere.  Specifically, there were 7 alternative in-
state public universities, all of which charged tuition that was within 3% of that charged 
by the flagship.  Second, while an ideal test would be to observe if there is a discontinuity 
in full-time labor force participation at the admission cutoff during the years in which the 
applicants would be in college, there are no earnings data available prior to the 4
th quarter 
of 1992, and even then the data do not contain information on hours worked.  
Consequently, I examine whether cohorts who applied from 1992 – 1995 were more 
likely to earn at least $20,000/year
20 in the four years following high school graduation if 
they were accepted to and/or enrolled at the flagship, conditional on high school GPA 
and SAT score.  As shown in Table 2, fewer than one-half of one percent of applicants 
earn more than $20,000/year in the two years following high school graduation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
admission rule slightly during the process to accept more or fewer students, thereby introducing noise into 
the admission rule.   Finally, there was an appeals process for rejected applicants, though it affected 
relatively few students and was described by one admissions officer on the committee at the time as “very 
noisy”.     
20 The basis for using $20,000 is that according to the 1996 CPS March Supplement, white men ages 20 – 
22 in the flagship state who were not enrolled in college earned an average of $19,633 (adjusted to 2005 
dollars, as in the earnings data) in the prior year.  Those who were enrolled in college reported earning just 
under $9,000.  Consequently, this is a test of whether individuals report earning more than average for an 
non-enrolled individual or just over twice what the typical college enrollee reports making.    
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increasing slightly to 2.5% and 5.4% in the 3
rd and 4
th years.  The estimated effects of 
admission and enrollment are negative and mostly statistically significant, though all are 
small and suggest that marginal rejection causes fewer than 1 in 100 applicants to meet 
the earnings threshold of $20,000/year, which is at least suggestive that those applicants 
are primarily attending college.  Finally, given that this analysis relies on selection on 
observables to identify admission and enrollment effects, it is likely that these estimates 
overstate the negative effect of attending the flagship on earnings during the four years 
after high school.   
Conditional on attending college, it is likely that the applicants attended college in-
state: according to the national 1998 Residence and Migration Survey, over 85% of 
surveyed college students from the state in question were enrolled in their home state.  
Given that likelihood, the two primary potential explanations of the earnings premium 
due to attending the flagship state university are increased human capital formation and 
signaling.
21  With respect to the human capital explanation, the first possibility is that the 
flagship spends more on a full-time-equivalent basis than do the next-best-alternative 
state universities.  The relative spending of the alternative state universities are shown in 
Table 3.  While the 5 next-most-selective alternative universities do spend on average 6% 
less than the flagship, it seems unlikely that this relatively small difference in spending 
could cause the large flagship earnings premium for men.   
In contrast, it is more difficult to distinguish between other human capital 
accumulation explanations and signaling.  For example, while Table 3 shows that the 
next five most selective state universities have incoming freshmen classes with SAT 
                                                 
21 The return might also be higher if the flagship were located in a more favorable labor market.  In this 
state, however, the flagship university is in the least urban location of all the state universities.    
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scores between 65 and 100 points lower than the flagship’s freshmen class, that fact is 
consistent with both human capital and signaling explanations of the premium.
22   
 
7.  Conclusion 
  In this paper, I identify the causal effect of attending the flagship state university 
by utilizing a regression discontinuity design that compares the earnings of those who 
were just admitted by the flagship to the earnings of those who just missed the admission 
cutoff.  I do so by combining confidential student applicant records from a large flagship 
state university with earnings data collected by the state through the Unemployment 
Insurance program.  The results indicate that attending the flagship state university 
increases the earnings of 28 – 33 year-old white men by approximately 20%, which 
suggests that there are significant economic returns to college quality, at least in the 










                                                 
22 One might expect that if the premium were to work primarily through signaling, it may well decline with 
the age.  However, while no evidence of this was found, the ages studied (28 – 33) provide a relatively 
short time span with which to perform this test.    
    18 
References 
Angrist, Joshua, Guido Imbens, and Donald Rubin, “Identification of Causal Effects 
Using Instrumental Variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
91:434 (1996), 444-455.   
Angrist, Joshua, and Victor Lavy, “Using Maimonides’ Rule to Identify the Effect of 
Class Size on Scholastic Achievement,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:2 
(1999), 533-575.  
Ashenfelter, Orley, and Cecilia Rouse, “Income, Schooling, and Ability: Evidence from a 
New Sample of Identical Twins,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:1 (1998), 
253-284.    
Behrman, Jere, Mark Rozenzweig, and Paul Taubman, “College Choice and Wages: 
Estimates Using Data on Female Twins,” Review of Economics and Statistics 78 
(1996), 672-685. 
Black, Dan, and Jeff Smith, “How Robust Is the Evidence on the Effects of College 
Quality?  Evidence from Matching,” Journal of Econometrics 121 (2004), 99-124.   
Brewer, Dominic, Eric Eide, and Ronald Ehrenberg, “Does It Pay to Attend an Elite 
Private College?  Cross-Cohort Evidence on the Effects of College Type on 
Earnings,” Journal of Human Resources 34:1 (1999), 104-123.   
Card, David, and David Lee, “Regression Discontinuity Inference with Specification 
Error,” NBER Technical Working Paper 322 (2006), accessed at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/T0322.   
Dale, Stacy Berg and Alan Krueger, “Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More 
Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and 
Unobservables,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:4 (2002), 1491-1527.      
Hahn, Jinyong, Petra Todd and Wilbert Van der Klaauw, “Identification and Estimation 
of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design,” Econometrica 69:1 
(2001), 201-209.   
Jacob, Brian and Lars Lefgren, “The Impact of Teacher Training on Student 
Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from School Reform Efforts in 
Chicago,” Journal of Human Resources 39:1 (2004), 50-79.   
Lindahl, Lena and Hakan Regner, “College Choice and Subsequent Earnings: Results 
using Swedish Sibling Data,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107:3 (2005), 
437-457. 
Mincer, Jacob, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings (New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1974).    




































-300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
SAT Points Above or Below the Admission Cutoff
Predicted Probability Local Average
Estimated Discontinuity = 0.388 (t=10.57)
 




















































-300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
SAT Points Above the Admission Cutoff
Predicted Earnings Local Average
Estimated Discontinuity = 0.095 (z = 3.01) 
 
Figure 2:  The Natural Log of Annual Earnings for White Men 10 - 15 Years after High 
School Graduation (Fit with a cubic polynomial of adjusted SAT score)  
Table 1:  Earnings Discontinuities and Corresponding Intent-to-Treat and Enrollment Estimates for White Men 
Discontinuity












(1) cubic No No 0.095*** 0.135*** 0.223***
Plotted in Figure 2 (0.032)    (0.046)    (0.079)   
[0.003]    [0.004]    [0.005]   
(2) cubic No Yes 0.092*** 0.131*** 0.216***
(0.033)    (0.048)    (0.081)   
[0.005]    [0.006]    [0.008]   
(3) quadratic  Yes Yes 0.111** 0.170** 0.281**
(0.045)    (0.073)    (0.121)   
[0.014]    [0.019]    [0.021]   
(4) quadratic No Yes 0.081** 0.116** 0.192**
(0.038)   (0.056)   (0.094)  
[0.034]   [0.038]   [0.041]  
(5) linear No Yes 0.074** 0.110*  0.181* 
(0.038)   (0.058)    (0.099)   
[0.050]   [0.060]    [0.067]   
Intent-to-treat and enrollment effects are estimated using two-stage least squares.  
Treatment Effect
(Includes only applicants 
within 200 points of cutoff)
(Includes only applicants 
within 100 points of cutoff)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; p-values are given in brackets.  Additional controls include (residual) SAT 
score and (residual) high school GPA.  "Flexible Polynomial" indicates whether the estimated coefficients of the adjusted SAT score 
polynomial were allowed to differ on each side of the admission cutoff.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
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Table 2:  The Earnings of Male Applicants in the Four Years Following High School and the Effect of Admission and Enrollment at 
the Flagship on Earning More than $20,000/year During the College Years 
Time Period
Average Earnings
1st Year after High School $2,300 63.9% $7,403 0.3% -0.003*   -0.003***
{$3,545} {48.0%} {$4,840} {5.6%} (0.002)    (0.001)   
2nd year after High School $3,040 63.4% $9,132 1.0% 0.002    -0.005***
{$4,709} {48.0%} {$5,905} {10.0%} (0.003)    (0.002)   
3rd year after High School $3,845 62.7% $10,848 2.5% -0.014*** -0.012***
{$6,156} {48.4%} {$8,174} {15.7%} (0.004)     (0.003)   
4th Year after High School $5,206 65.2% $13,403 5.4% -0.003   -0.012**
{$8,091} {47.6%} {$10,548} {22.6%} (0.007)   (0.004)  
The sample includes 15,321 white male applicants to the 1992-93 through 1995-96 academic years.  Standard deviations are in {brackets}; robust standard errors are in 
(parentheses).  All specifications include a cubic of high school GPA and SAT score and indicators for the year-term in which the individuals applied.  Asterisks *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
Admission and Enrollment Effects Summary Statistics
% Sample Earning 
>$20k/year
% Applicants in 
Labor Force
Average Earnings for 
Applicants in Labor 
Force for All 4 Quarters
Effect of Admission on 
the probability of earning 
more than $20k
Effect of Enrollment on 
on the probability of 






Table 3:  The Selectivity and Educational Inputs of the In-State Public Universities 
In-State Selectivity Rank  Per Student Spending/Flagship's 
Per Student Spending
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Appendix B  
Table B1: Traditional Instrumental Variable Estimates 
Row Estimation Type Sample Function of 
Adjusted SAT









1 2SLS Full none quadratic 0.084** 0.145** 0.052 0.092
(Conventional IV) (0.038 (0.068) (0.053) (0.094)
[0.029] [0.034] [0.322] [0.332]
2 2SLS Full none cubic 0.076** 0.135* 0.052 0.093
(Conventional IV) (0.040) (0.071) (0.054) (0.096)
[0.057] [0.057] [0.335] [0.336]
3 2SLS none quadratic 0.110** 0.192** 0.066 0.108
(Conventional IV) (0.046) (0.080) (0.063) (0.104)
[0.017] [0.017] [0.294] [0.297]
4 2SLS none linear 0.098* 0.161* 0.125 0.189
(Conventional IV) (0.055) (0.091) (0.078) (0.120)
[0.077] [0.077] [0.110] [0.116]
Only applicants 
within 200 points 
of  admission cutoff
Only applicants 
within 100 points 
of  admission cutoff
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; p-values are  in brackets.  All specifications control for indicators for each year after HS graduation in 
which earnings are observed and for each year/term of application.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Women with Strong Attachment 
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Figure C1:  The Natural Log of Annual Earnings for White Women 10 – 15 Years after High 
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Figure C2:  The Natural Log of Annual Earnings for White Women with Strong Attachment to 
the Labor Force 10 – 15 Years after High School Graduation (Fit with a cubic of 
adjusted SAT score)25 
Table C1: Women’s Returns to Attending the Flagship State University on Earnings 
Discontinuity Discontinuity















(1) cubic No No -0.008 -0.011 -0.019 0.061 0.079 0.131
(0.030) (0.040) (0.067) (0.048) (0.061) (0.104)
[0.779] [0.779] [0.779] [0.206] [0.202] [0.214]
(2) cubic No Yes -0.008 -0.011 -0.019 0.064 0.082 0.136
(0.029) (0.040) (0.067) (0.047) (0.060) (0.103)
[0.780] [0.780] [0.780]  [0.184] [0.180] [0.193]
(3) quadratic  Yes Yes 0.020 0.028 0.047 0.094* 0.121* 0.195*
(0.028) (0.040) (0.065)  (0.048)  (0.061)  (0.103)
[0.476] [0.477] [0.475]    [0.053]  [0.053]  [0.063]
(4) quadratic No Yes -0.018 -0.024 -0.039 0.056 0.070 0.111
(0.028) (0.038) (0.062) (0.047) (0.058) (0.094)
[0.533] [0.531] [0.532] [0.236]  [0.235] [0.244]
(5) linear No Yes -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 0.101* 0.133*  0.203* 
(0.035) (0.049) (0.078)  (0.055)  (0.071)    (0.115)   
[0.875] [0.875]  [0.875]  [0.081]   [0.074]    [0.094]   
Intent-to-treat and enrollment effects are estimated using two-stage least squares.  
Treatment Effect
to the Labor Force
All Women
Women with Strong Attachment
Treatment Effect
(Includes only applicants 
within 200 points of cutoff)
(Includes only applicants 
within 100 points of cutoff)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of adjusted SAT scores are in parentheses; p-values are given in brackets.  Additional controls include (residual) SAT 
score and (residual) high school GPA.  "Flexible Polynomial" indicates whether the estimated coefficients of the adjusted SAT score polynomial were allowed to differ 
on each side of the admission cutoff.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
 
 